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TRADE UNIONS AND THE CHALLENGES 
OF EU ENLARGEMENT: ‘THE KIND OF 
LAWS THE UNIONS OUGHT TO WANT’
Rebecca Zahn*
Abstract
h e recent EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 have thrown up changed regulatory 
and opportunity structures for European trade unions, primarily as a consequence of 
an increase in the free movement of workers, services and establishment. In addition, 
the European enlargements came at a time when Member State governments were 
attempting to ‘modernise’ their labour and social security systems in order to combat 
the ef ects of an enlarged Europe within a globalised world economy. As a result, trade 
unions i nd themselves in a vulnerable position within their domestic legal systems 
and are required to reassess the type of functions that they can adopt at a national 
and European level in order to ef ectively respond to European enlargement. Against 
this background, this article considers the kind of laws the unions ought to want in 
order to ef ectively respond to the challenges facing them following the enlargements.
Keywords: European enlargement; labour law; migration; trade unions
1. INTRODUCTION
h e European Union (EU) enlargements which occurred in 2004 and 2007 are 
unprecedented in scale in the EU’s history. A majority of the ten Central and Eastern 
European countries which acceded in 2004 and 2007 combine weak domestic labour 
protection systems with a high proportion of workers and enterprises keen to take 
advantage of their free movement rights under the European Treaty. Combined with 
recent developments in the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) case law 
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which created a dii  cult interface between national labour law and the provisions 
on free movement contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), 
this has created a climate of fear amongst workers and trade unions in old Member 
States that their economic and social position is being threatened by those workers 
and enterprises who may avail themselves of their rights under the Treaty in order to 
engage in ‘social dumping’. In addition, the European enlargements came at a time 
when old Member State governments were attempting to ‘modernise’ their labour and 
social security systems in order to combat the ef ects of an enlarged Europe within a 
globalised world economy, thereby threatening not only traditional trade union roles 
in the labour law system but undermining the purpose of collective labour law in 
regulating such a system. h e increase in the free movement of workers following 
the European enlargements have exacerbated these pre-existing problems for trade 
unions. As a result, trade unions i nd themselves in a vulnerable position within their 
domestic legal systems and are required to reassess the type of functions that they can 
adopt at a national and European level in order to ef ectively respond to European 
enlargement.
h is article proceeds on the basis that trade unions are necessary in order to 
preserve an equilibrium of power between workers and employers. It has long been 
recognised that unions are associated with a reduction in wage inequality, better 
workplace practices, improved health and safety, less labour turnover and increased 
productivity.1 In addition, trade unions can play an important role in ensuring the 
ef ective enforcement of legislation by giving workers ‘the strength to insist on the 
maintenance of legal standards.’2 h is is particularly relevant in the wake of the EU 
enlargements, where there is evidence that new Member State workers ot en struggle 
to enforce their rights at work.3
Against this background, this article considers, to borrow a title from Clive Jenkins 
and J.E. Mortimer, ‘the kind of laws the unions ought to want’.4 In order to achieve 
this purpose, the article i rst provides a cursory introduction to the functions that 
trade unions adopt within their specii c labour law systems and explains why these 
functions are under threat. In order to illustrate the challenges that trade unions are 
facing, this article draws on examples from the Austrian, German, Irish, and British 
industrial relations systems. Trade unions in these four countries are struggling to 
i nd ways to deal with the consequences of the recent European enlargements and, 
in particular, the arrival of new Member State workers. h ey are adopting similar 
functions within their respective national labour law systems. A second section of 
1 See R. Freeman and J. Medof , What Do Unions Do? (Basic Books 1984); S. Hayter (ed.), h e Role of 
Collective Bargaining in the Global Economy (Edward Elgar/ILO 2011); and, L. Hayes and T. Novitz, 
Trade Unions and Economic Inequality (IER 2014).
2 P. Davies and M. Freedland (eds.), Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (3rd edn, Stevens 1983) 19.
3 See, for example, TUC Commission on Vulnerable Employment, Hard Work, Hidden Lives (TUC 
2007) or DGB, Grenzenlos faire Mobilität (DGB 2012).
4 C. Jenkins, h e Kind of Laws the Unions Ought to Want (Pergamon 1968).
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the article discusses why trade unions should consider law as a means of responding 
to the challenges of EU enlargement and what the obstacles are to such a strategy. A 
i nal section outlines the kind of laws trade unions ought to want. In doing so, the 
article moves beyond the current literature to provide a broader picture of necessary 
legislative changes which would assist trade unions in responding to the ef ects of 
European enlargement and to better integrate new Member State workers into their 
host labour market.
2. TRADE UNION FUNCTIONS UNDER THREAT
Keith Ewing identii es i ve principal functions of unions: a service function; a 
representation function; a regulatory function; a government function; and a public 
administration function.5 It should be noted at this point that the functions that 
Ewing identii es are based on a British point of view. Nonetheless, the categories 
which he identii es are sui  ciently broad to encompass the main functions of trade 
unions within most European industrial relations systems. h ey thus form a useful 
starting point for an analysis of trade union roles and functions.6
h e ambit of each of these functions is largely self-evident. According to Ewing, ‘a 
service function means a function which involves the provision of services and benei ts 
to members.’7 h e meaning of the representation function is, again, obvious. All 
trade unions represent the interests of the worker at his place of work. h e regulatory 
function ‘acknowledges that trade unions are involved in a process of rule-making 
that extends beyond their members or the immediate colleagues of their members.’8 
Finally, the governmental and public administration functions of trade unions have 
two dimensions: i rst, trade unions represent ‘the organised political representation 
of working people, both as a means of restraining the power of the State and a means 
of harnessing the power of the State’;9 secondly, trade unions engage ‘in the process 
of government in the sense of being involved in the development, implementation and 
delivery of government policy.’10
h ese traditional functions which characterise trade unions across all the 
countries at issue in this article are increasingly under threat from, inter alia, a 
5 K.D. Ewing, ‘h e Function of Trade Unions’ (2005) ILJ 1.
6 For an alternative analysis of trade unions in terms of the relationships which they form within 
a national system, see R. Gumbrell-McCormick and R. Hyman, Trade Unions in Western Europe: 
Hard Times, Hard Choices (OUP 2013). Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman describe trade 
unions as being embedded in four main types of relationship: i rst, with their own members and 
constituents; second, with employers; third, with governments (which overlaps with Ewing’s public 
administration function); and, fourth, with ‘civil society’.






growing service sector; changing labour markets with increased emphasis on l exible 
and atypical forms of work; and trade union i nancial constraints that have come 
about as a result of decreasing membership levels.11 At the level of government 
policy, there have been attempts to ‘modernise’ labour and social security systems in 
order to combat the ef ects of an enlarged Europe within a globalised world economy 
and its associated phenomena such as ‘social dumping’.12 h e problems of changing 
economic and labour market conditions in an increasingly globalised world have 
been present in the EU for some time and have in some cases (particularly Ireland 
and the UK) been exacerbated by the recent i nancial crisis.13 However, the EU 
enlargements have added an extra layer of complexity to these pre-existing problems 
facing trade union functions. Most visibly, the enlargements have resulted in an 
increase in the free movement of workers14 which has created a number of challenges 
for trade unions.
First, there is a fear that new Member State workers may avail themselves of their 
free movement rights under EU Law to threaten the economic and social position 
of workers and trade unions in old Member States by engaging in ‘social dumping’. 
Second, trade unions struggle to integrate new Member State workers into their 
structures and, as a result, new Member State workers frequently suf er from unfair 
employment practices. h is creates tensions within the labour market between groups 
of workers which trade unions are badly placed to counter. Migration has always 
posed an inherent dilemma to trade unions,15 especially as opposing immigration 
‘contradict[s] notions of international solidarity.’16 Also, it may seem logical for trade 
unions to oppose immigration as migrant workers are perceived to pose a threat to 
indigenous workers who form the organisational base of the trade unions. However, 
‘once there are migrant workers in the country, it is essential to organise them – not 
only in their own interests, but also in the interests of the rest of the workers.’17 h is is 
particularly true of EU migrants, as restricting their entry – which is governed by EU 
law – is not a feasible option.
11 For an excellent comparative analysis and references to relevant literature, see Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman (n 6).
12 See, further, C. Barnard, ‘Social dumping and the race to the bottom: some lessons for the European 
Union from Delaware?’ (2000) ELR 57.
13 For an overview of some of the literature on the Eurozone crisis, see http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
lsereviewob ooks/tag/euro-crisis/. h e ef ect of the crisis on national labour law systems is explained 
by the ETUI in individual country reports here: https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Working-
Papers/h e-crisis-and-national-labour-law-reforms-a-mapping-exercise.
14 See, further, G. Meardi, ‘Union Immobility? Trade Unions and the Freedoms of Movement in the 
Enlarged EU’ (2012) BJIR 99, 103–4.
15 See, further, S. Castles and G. Kosack, Migrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe 
(OUP 1973).
16 McGovern, Patrick, ‘Immigration, Labour Markets and Employment Relations: Problems and 
Prospects’ (2007) BJIR 217, 228.
17 Castles and Kosack (n 15) 128.
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Second, the EU’s policy of ‘europeanising’ national labour law systems has had 
an ef ect on the environment within which trade unions act by creating a dii  cult 
interface between free movement law and national labour regulation thereby increasing 
the complex legal framework within which trade unions act. h e debate surrounding 
the nature of ‘europeanisation’18 has been raging in the EU for a number of years. It 
raises a variety of issues regarding the impact of the EU and its actions on the domestic 
politics and institutions of Member States and vice versa. ‘Europeanisation’ in the area 
of labour law has resulted in the progressive introduction of a social dimension to 
the EU. However, any attempts which have been made to introduce a comprehensive 
policy – largely under the banner of a so-called European Social Model – have been 
dependent on the ef ective accommodation of political interests.19 As a result, the 
European Social Model is patchy in its coverage of rights and has a curious character. 
Initially conceived of as a ‘market-correcting’ tool and then gradually widened through 
increased legislative competence so as to foster ‘socio-economic integration’,20 it never 
developed as an all-encompassing and comprehensive European social policy. Prior to 
the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the lack of a comprehensive social dimension 
at EU level did not create major obstacles to the ef ective exercise of the free movement 
provisions contained in the Treaty. However, the particular characteristics of the new 
Member States’ economic and institutional structures – on the one hand, favourable 
industrialisation legacies, skill structures and a stable institutional environment;21 and, 
on the other hand, low wage levels and collective agreement coverage as compared to 
Western Europe22 – have resulted in an intensii cation of competition that had not 
occurred at er the previous23 enlargements. At the same time, the CJEU’s recent case 
law in the social sphere has created a dii  cult interface between social rights and EU 
18 ‘Europeanisation’ has been dei ned broadly in the academic literature by various writers. For one 
of the earliest dei nitions of the term see R. Ladrech, ‘Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and 
Institutions: h e Case of France’ (1994) JCMS 69, 69. Other authors who have examined the meaning 
of europeanisation include T.A. Börzel and T. Risse, ‘When Europe hits home: Europeanisation 
and Domestic Change’ (2000) European Integration Online Papers 4; J. Olsen, ‘h e Many Faces 
of Europeanisation’ (2002) JCMS 921; K. Featherstone and C.M. Radaelli (eds.), h e Politics of 
Europeanisation (OUP 2003); and, R. Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics (Palgrave 
2010).
19 See Ulrich Weinstock, ‘Europäische Sozialunion – historische Erfahrungen und Perspektiven‘ in 
Wolfgang Däubler (ed.), Sozialstaat EG? Die andere Dimension des Binnenmarktes (Bertelsmann 
1989).
20 D. Schiek, Economic and Social Integration: h e Challenge for EU Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar 
2012) 50.
21 D. Bohle and B. Greskovits, ‘h e state, internationalization, and capitalist diversity in Eastern 
Europe’ (2007) Competition and Change 89.
22 Colin Crouch and Sabina Avdagic, ‘Organized economic interests: diversity and change in 
an enlarged Europe’ in Paul M. Heywood, Erik Jones, Martin Rhodes and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 
Developments in European Politics (Palgrave 2006).
23 For example, during the ‘southern’ accessions: Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986). See also D. 
Vaughan-Whitehead, EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? h e uncertain future of the European 
Social Model (Edward Elgar 2003).
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free movement law24 which has not been adequately resolved by the EU legislative 
institutions.25 Taken together, the incomplete nature of the EU’s social dimension 
coupled with the CJEU’s recent case law have thrown up not only changed regulatory 
structures but also opportunities for European trade unions.26 h ese changes at a 
European level have occurred primarily as a consequence of an increase in the free 
movement of workers, services and establishment. As a result, trade unions i nd 
themselves in a vulnerable position within their domestic legal systems and are required 
to reassess the functions that they can adopt at a national and European level in order to 
ef ectively respond to European enlargement, primarily by facilitating the integration 
of new Member State workers into their host labour markets. h is article argues that, 
as part of this process, trade unions should consider legislative changes which would 
help them to better respond to the changing environment existing at a national and 
European level following the recent enlargements. A successful response to the ef ects 
of European enlargement could help trade unions to dei ne a new role for themselves 
in their national labour law systems to ensure their continued relevance as institutions.
3. THE ARGUMENT FOR LAW – WHY AND HOW?
Jenkins and Mortimer, writing in 1968 about British ‘collective laissez-faire’,27 make 
a convincing case in their book h e kind of laws the unions ought to want28 for a legal 
framework which not only protects trade union rights but also establishes minimum 
labour standards; such laws are not designed to replace voluntary action by trade 
unions but to complement it by creating a framework within which ef ective collective 
bargaining can take place. Jenkins and Mortimer argue that sole reliance on industrial 
strength is both harmful to workers’ interests and results in ‘serious defects […] in 
relation to trade union rights.’29 h is has become particularly obvious in the wake of 
the European enlargements in Austria, Germany, Ireland and the UK, where trade 
unions have struggled ef ectively to enforce labour rights of both national workers and 
24 Case C-438/05 h e International Transport Workers’ Federation and h e Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, Byggettan, Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüf ert, in his capacity as liquidator of the 
assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989. For a small 
selection of literature see the website of the European Trade Union Institute (www.etui.org/Topics/
Social-dialogue-collective-bargaining/Social-legislation/h e-interpretation-by-the-European-
Court-of-Justice/Reaction-to-the-judgements/Articles-in-academic-literature-on-the-judgements).
25 See, further, h e Adoptive Parents, ‘h e Life of a Death Foretold: h e Proposal for a Monti II 
Regulation’ in Mark Freedland and Jeremias Prassl, Viking, Laval and Beyond (Hart 2014).
26 See also Meardi (n 14).
27 See, further, Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Labour Law’ in Morris Ginsberg (ed.), Law and Opinion in 
England in the 20th Century( Stevens 1959).
28 Jenkins (n 4).
29 Ibid vii.
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migrants and, as a result, to react to the consequences of the europeanisation of their 
national labour law systems by relying solely on traditional trade union functions.
Jenkins’ and Mortimer’s approach harks back to Sydney and Beatrice Webbs’ 
analysis which advocated multiple methods of trade unionism: mutual insurance, 
collective bargaining and ‘legal enactment’ (legislative change).30 According to the 
Webbs, the increasing power of industry would mean that ‘the only available method 
of securing a Common Rule is Legal Enactment.’31 h e alternative is ‘Trade Union 
failure and decay’.32
h e regulatory challenges facing trade unions following the EU enlargements 
make collective bargaining increasingly dii  cult. h e ‘powerful interests’ described 
by the Webbs can now be found both at a national and European level, and threaten 
to undermine established national industrial relations systems. Legislative change 
provides an alternative method for trade unions which, if successful, could support 
primarily their representation and regulation functions. h us, the principal purpose 
of legislative change must be ‘to regulate, to support and to restrain the power of 
management and the power of organised labour’;33 it is instrumental in correcting 
the imbalance in bargaining power inherent within the employment relationship,34 
and complements collective bargaining as a method of trade unionism. Historically, 
labour legislation has indirectly provided support for the ef ective functioning of 
collective bargaining in all countries at issue in this article. In Germany, labour 
legislation’s purpose is understood as ‘creating a framework for the autonomous 
regulation of terms and conditions of employment by the workers and employers’.35 
In Austria, legislation was adopted which allowed trade unions and employers 
jointly to regulate the labour market without state interference. In both countries, 
trade unions and employers were also embedded in the economy more broadly by 
being granted power and inl uence which went beyond industrial relations narrowly 
dei ned.36 Social partnership in Ireland granted a similar role to trade unions whereby 
30 S. Webb and B. Webb, Industrial Democracy (Longman, 1920).
31 Ibid, 554.
32 Ibid.
33 Davies and Freedland (n 2) 15.
34 For an overview of the literature on labour law’s purpose, see P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour 
Law: Text and Materials (2nd edn., Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1984); S. Deakin and F. Wilkinson, 
h e Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment, and Legal Evolution (OUP, 2005); 
H. Collins, ‘Justii cations and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation’ in H. 
Collins, P. Davies and R. Rideout (eds.), Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation (Kluwer 2000); 
and, B. Hepple, ‘Factors Inl uencing the Making of Labour Law’ in G. Davidov and B. Langille 
(eds.), h e Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2011). For a critique, see R. Dukes, h e Labour Constitution: 
h e Enduring Idea of Labour Law (OUP 2014) 92–122 and 194–221.
35 Dukes, ibid 8.
36 See, further, W. Streeck, ‘Industrial Relations: From State Weakness as Strength to State Weakness 
as Weakness. Welfare Corporatism and the Private Use of the Public Interest’ in S. Green and 




the state provided a framework for collective bargaining to take place on a regular 
basis and on a broad range of topics.37 In the UK, the regulation of the employment 
relationship occurred under the umbrella of ‘collective laissez-faire’. As Wedderburn 
points out:
Although it has always suited its detractors to paint it as a lawless jungle, collective 
laissez-faire involved not ‘no law’, but rather a particular type or quality of law, one which 
put a premium on protecting autonomous collective bargaining and which necessarily, 
demanded areas of liberty for trade unions.38
Within each legal system, legislative intervention – either through positive legal 
encouragement or through the creation by the State of an autonomous space for 
employers and trade unions – therefore provided the necessary framework within which 
trade unions could exercise their primary functions: to represent their members vis-à-
vis the employer and, against that background, to engage in collective bargaining for 
the regulation of terms and conditions of work. h e other functions exercised by trade 
unions complement this primary function. h us, the service function, while relevant, 
can also be provided by other organisations which are either linked to the trade union 
movement – such as the Arbeiterkammer in Austria39 – or separate from it; the Migrant 
Rights Centre in Ireland40 being one example which has taken over much of the provision 
of advice to migrant workers from trade unions. h e government function inter alia 
enables trade unions to secure necessary support for positive legislative developments.
Over the last twenty years, the vulnerability of trade union functions has become 
obvious across all four countries at issue in this article, albeit to varying degrees in each 
State. h e UK stands out as a clear example of a system where reliance on industrial 
strength alone let  trade unions vulnerable to unfavourable legal regulation in the 1980s 
which resulted in the eventual decline of trade union inl uence across a number of 
sectors. More recent examples of trade union vulnerability can, however, also be found 
37 h e Irish system of social partnership was founded on the conclusion of a succession of National 
Partnership Agreements between the Irish social partners between 1987 and 2009, which provided 
a framework for collective bargaining to take place on a regular basis and resulted in the conclusion 
of a national agreement i xing wage increases, but also dealing with other topics such as pensions 
and compliance with labour standards. See, further, W.K. Roche, ‘Social Partnership in Ireland and 
New Social Pacts’ (2007) 46(3) Industrial Relations 395.
38 K.W. Wedderburn, ‘Change, struggle and ideology in British labour law’ in K.W. Wedderburn, 
Labour Law and Freedom (Lawrence and Wishart 1995) 24.
39 h e Arbeiterkammer (Labour Chamber) is a federal structure, established by public law with 
compulsory membership, which represents employees’ interests. h e Arbeiterkammer is unique 
to the Austrian labour law system and plays an important part in social partnership which is 
complementary to that of trade unions. See further M.E. Risak, Labour Law in Austria (Kluwer 2010).
40 h e Migrant Rights Centre is a non-governmental organisation which of ers an advisory service 
and participates in organising campaigns around relevant issues. It has a working relationship 
with a number of Irish trade unions and has taken on a strong advisory role in relation to migrant 
workers.
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in Ireland, Austria or Germany. h us, the breakdown of social partnership41 – not 
anchored in law – in the wake of the economic crisis has deprived Irish trade unions of 
aspects of their regulatory function as well as their governmental function. In contrast, 
despite their aversion to legal intervention, trade unions in Austria and Germany seem to 
have recognised the increasing precariousness of their role within their respective labour 
law systems, and have used their governmental function in order to press for legislative 
change which can help to secure their relevance. h e introduction of a minimum wage 
in Germany42 is one such example, as is the Austrian trade unions’ lobbying for the 
recognition of social partnership within the Austrian Constitution.43 h e changing 
regulatory and opportunity structures which have arisen following the recent EU 
enlargements have further challenged traditional trade union functions. It is therefore 
timely to consider legislative change as an alternative method of trade unionism. As 
the Webbs recognised, ‘if Collective Bargaining, with its inevitable accompaniment of 
collective abstention from work and occasional stoppages of industry, is, by the judges’ 
interpretation of the law, made impossible, or even costly and dii  cult, the whole weight 
of working-class opinion will certainly be thrown in favor of Legal Enactment.’44
How, then, should legislative change be achieved? One obstacle to legislative 
change is that trade unions must enjoy a signii cant measure of political strength45 
which is variable across dif erent countries. In Austria and Germany, the level of 
political involvement and positive labour legislation are dependent on the party in 
government at any one time. In Ireland, trade union political power depended on 
41 h e onset of the i nancial crisis had a dramatic impact on the system of social partnership and the 
locus of collective bargaining has shit ed to the company level where trade unions are present in 
the workplace. See, further, M. Doherty, ‘It must have been love … but it’s over now: the crisis and 
collapse of social partnership in Ireland’ (2011) 17 Transfer 371.
42 h ere has been an intense political debate in Germany in recent years as to the benei ts and 
disadvantages of a minimum wage. German trade unions initially had great dii  culty in supporting 
the idea of a minimum wage as it implied that collective agreements were no longer sui  cient to 
regulate industrial relations. It also meant that trade unions had to accept state involvement in the 
sphere of industrial relations; an area where regulation is usually let  to the social partners and the 
courts. However, due to the decline in trade union strength through falling membership numbers 
and the increase in industries that are not covered by a collective agreement, German trade unions 
recognised the importance of a statutory minimum wage. A statutory minimum wage was adopted 
in Germany in April 2014 and came into ef ect in 2015. See, further, Mindestlohngesetz vom 11. 
August 2014 BGBI. I S. 1348 and M. Spielberger and A. Schilling, ‘Das Gesetz zur Regelung eines 
allgemeinen Mindestlohns’ (2014) 67(40) Neue Juristische Wochenschrit  2897.
43 h e coalition government between the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the centre-
right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), in power between 2000 and 2007, overtly challenged social 
partnership which had no statutory basis. h e realisation by the social partners of the precariousness 
of their role led to increased calls for legislative change in order to codify social partnership in the 
Austrian Constitution. Article 120a (paragraph 2) now acknowledges the role of the social partners. 
See, further, H. Obinger and E. Talos, Sozialstaat Österreich Zwischen Kontinuität und Umbau: Eine 
Bilanz der ÖVP/FPÖ/BZÖ Koalition (VS Verlag 2006).
44 Webb and Webb (n 30) xxxvi.
45 See E. Fraenkel, ‘Die politische Bedeutung des Arbeitsrechts’ in T. Ramm (ed.) Arbeitsrecht und 
Politik Quellentexte 1918–1933 (Luchterhand 1966) 249; and, Davies and Freedland (n 2) 52.
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the maintenance of the system of social partnership. Although British trade unions 
have long had strong institutionalised links with a political party, legislative changes 
introduced in 2014 to restrict trade union electoral activity46 coupled with changes 
to trade union involvement in the Labour Party47 threaten to severely restrict 
opportunities for engagement for trade unions with the political process. In order for 
trade unions to rely on legal enactment as an ef ective method, they should therefore 
focus on establishing and maintaining strong ties with political parties. As the Webbs 
have argued, trade unions ‘would be strongly, and even permanently, drawn to any 
political leader, of whatever party, who shared their faith in the ei  cacy of [collective 
bargaining], and who convinced them that he had the technical knowledge, the will, 
and the Parliamentary power to carry into law such proposals for legal regulation as 
each trade from time to time dei nitely demanded.’48
In order to ensure their continued relevance, therefore, trade unions cannot 
continue as they have done by focussing the majority of their attention at preserving 
the status quo. Instead, ‘trade unions must be engaged politically in order to secure 
legislation that will enable them to challenge the power of the employer, as well as 
legislation that will directly regulate the conduct of the employer in its dealings with 
their members.’49 h e alternative threatens, in the long run, to undermine the purpose 
of a trade union and thereby to threaten their very existence. h is begs the question 
what kind of laws the unions ought to want.
4. THE KIND OF LAWS THE UNIONS OUGHT TO WANT
In the increasing absence of government support and in order to maintain their status 
as ‘a power countervailing management’,50 Jenkins and Mortimer argue that trade 
unions need a legal framework of ai  rmative trade union rights along with laws which 
establish minimum standards for all workers.51 h e precise content of such laws may 
vary from one legal system to another. However, a number of general suggestions can 
be made in light of the challenges facing trade unions following the recent European 
enlargements. First, trade unions need laws which guarantee the right to freedom of 
association.52 Second, trade unions require laws which establish a l oor of rights for all 
workers. Such laws will enable trade unions to exercise their functions ef ectively in 
order to challenge the employer and to regulate the employer’s conduct.
46 Transparency of Lobbying, Nonparty Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014.
47 See K. D. Ewing, ‘h e Importance of Trade Union Political Voice: Labour Law Meets Constitutional 
Law’ in A. Bogg and T. Novitz, Voices at Work (OUP 2014).
48 Webb and Webb (n 30) 539.
49 Ewing (n 47) 277.
50 Davies and Freedland (n 2) 21.
51 Jenkins (n 4) vii.
52 Webb and Webb (n 30) 557–9.
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Due to the ef ects of europeanisation on national labour law systems, 
consideration must be given as to whether legislative demands should be made at an 
EU level in order to alleviate the negative consequences of europeanisation. Limited 
EU competence restricts the opportunities for legislative developments. Current 
legislative competences in the area of European social policy include not only the 
provisions contained in the EU Treaties which enable the EU institutions to act in 
order to facilitate the free movement of workers, but also Article 153(1) TFEU, which 
provides for the introduction of Directives on working conditions, information and 
consultation of workers, and equality at work between men and women. Article 153(4) 
TFEU allows Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent protective 
measures compatible with the Treaties. However, Article  153(5) expressly excludes 
competence over pay, the right of association and the right to strike. As Schiek points 
out, EU industrial relations constitute a ‘multi-level system’53 with the main regulatory 
authority and institutions residing at the national level. For trade unions, this gives 
rise to complex levels of interaction whereby some legislative demands can be targeted 
at the national and the EU level, whereas others should predominantly focus on the 
national level. h e issue of competence is dealt with in relation to each section below.
4.1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK WHICH GUARANTEES THE RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
h e right of workers to organise in a trade union has long been recognised as a 
fundamental right. It is enshrined in Article 11 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR),54 Articles  5 and 6 of the European Social Charter (ESC)55 and in 
Conventions 87 and 98 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).56 h e right 
has been recognised to include the right to collective bargaining and, more recently, 
the right to take collective action.57 States, as signatories to these international 
instruments, have a duty to uphold and protect these rights. Yet, achieving adequate 
protection of the right to freedom of association raises a conundrum for trade unions 
which is embodied in the ILO’s Convention No. 87 on the Right to Organise: the law 
53 D. Schiek, EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law, Study for the Empl Committee 
of the European Parliament (2015) 60.
54 For a detailed overview of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, see F. Dorssemont, K. Lörcher and I. Schömann 
(eds.), h e European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation (Hart, 2013).
55 See S. Evju, ‘h e European social Charter’ in R Blanpain (ed.), h e Council of Europe and the Social 
Challenges of the XXI Century (Kluwer, 2001).
56 h ese are the main relevant texts. Other ILO Conventions and Recommendations refer to the 
respective rights. See A. Odero and H. Guido, ILO Law on Freedom of Association: Standards and 
Procedures (ILO, 1995). See, further, T. Novitz, International and European Protection of the Right 
to Strike (OUP, 2003).
57 For an overview, see N. Busby and R. Zahn, ‘Collective Labour Rights in EU and International Law: 
Consolidation, Reconciliation and Beyond?’ in D. Brodie, N. Busby and R. Zahn (eds.), h e Future 
Regulation of Work: New Concepts, New Paradigms (Palgrave 2016).
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should enable workers and employers to exercise their right to organise without, at the 
same time, interfering in that process. Similarly, ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right 
to Organise and Collective Bargaining protects the right to organise from interference, 
but also calls for the State to encourage and promote collective bargaining. States have 
responded to this conundrum by recognising the right to freedom of association as a 
fundamental right while, at the same time, placing restrictions on its exercise. h us, 
freedom of association is recognised in the Austrian, Irish and German constitutions. 
In the UK, freedom of association has been enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998. 
However, the protection of the right to freedom of association – and its corollaries, 
the right to collective bargaining and the right to take collective action – to the level 
required by the relevant international instruments is far from assured in all countries 
at issue in this article; in some cases as a result of national developments, and in all 
cases as a consequence of the CJEU’s case law.
At a national level, the Trade Union Bill 201558 in the UK and the lack of 
recognition procedures for the purposes of collective bargaining in Ireland59 stand 
out as primary examples of cases where the State is failing to adequately guarantee 
the right to freedom of association in breach of international obligations. In 2015, 
the ILO’s Committee of Experts also criticised Germany’s comprehensive ban 
on industrial action applicable to civil servants.60 In theory, therefore, the right 
to freedom of association is protected in all Member States at issue in this article 
by virtue of the international agreements which they have signed. However, 
implementation in practice is ot en lacking. At a national level, trade unions should 
therefore continue to seek laws which give practical ef ect to the rights enshrined in 
international agreements.
At the EU level, the CJEU’s case law has placed severe restrictions on the exercise of 
the right to collective bargaining in cross-border cases where there is a clash with the 
freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment. To counter this negative 
development, trade unions require laws which adequately protect the right to freedom 
of association (and its corollaries, the right to collective bargaining and collective 
action) at EU level. h e EU’s competence in the sphere of collective rights, particularly 
freedom of association, collective bargaining and collective action, is limited, and any 
protection takes place largely through their status as fundamental rights. Following 
the entry into force of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) in 2009, 
protection of the rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining and collective 
action is guaranteed by Articles  12 and 28 CFR. However, the ef ectiveness of the 
provisions as individually enforceable rights will depend on the CJEU’s interpretation. 
58 See, further, M. Ford QC and T. Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness… Restrictions on Industrial Action 
and Protest in the Trade Union Bill 2015’ (2015) ILJ 522.
59 See also Ryanair Ltd v. h e Labour Court [2007] 4 I.R. 199 and the comments by the ILO’s Committee 
of Experts (CEACR), adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015) on Convention No 98.
60 See the comments by the ILO’s Committee of Experts (CEACR), adopted 2014, published 104th ILC 
session (2015) on Convention No. 87.
Trade Unions and the Challenges of EU Enlargement
European Labour Law Journal, Volume 7 (2016), No. 3 399
h e case law so far has not been promising,61 and it has been argued that the CJEU 
has ef ectively ‘disembowelled’62 the rights of any ef ect at EU level. h erefore, at the 
EU level, enhanced protection of labour rights is evident in theory but not in practice. 
Although the CJEU’s case law has progressively led to an acceptance of collective rights 
as general principles bolstered by the CFR’s ‘generous provision’63 for such rights, 
recent rulings64 by the Court fall far short of bestowing such rights with protected 
justiciable status and of guaranteeing the right to freedom of association to the level 
required by the ECHR, ESC and ILO Conventions. For EU Member States, this clash 
raises a dilemma over conl icting obligations owed at the EU and international levels 
while at the same time leaving a number of questions unanswered as to how the 
conl icting jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CJEU is to be reconciled particularly 
in light of the EU’s accession to the ECHR.65 h e multi-level system which protects (or 
threatens) the right to freedom of association raises opportunities for trade unions to 
demand legislative protection of the right not only at a national level but also within 
the EU context. In particular, it is essential that the right to freedom of association 
is guaranteed for trade unions at EU level as a right which is neither subordinate to 
economic freedoms nor subject to proportionality requirements.66
h ere are a number of options for the right to freedom of association to be protected 
at EU level. First, trade unions could petition for protection of the right to strike 
through EU legislation. Proposals have already been developed on a Social Progress 
Protocol to be inserted into the Treaties.67 In addition, although Article 153 TFEU 
expressly excludes EU competence in respect of the right to freedom of association 
and the right to strike, this has not prevented the Union from using alternative legal 
bases to propose measures, albeit unsuccessfully to date, on the exercise of the right 
to strike in the past.68 Second, the CFR has the potential to add value by expanding 
61 See Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-7091 and the Viking and Laval 
jurisprudence. For an analysis see P. Syrpis, ‘Reconciling Economic Freedoms and Social Rights – 
h e Potential of Commission v Germany (Case C-271/08, Judgment of 15 July 2010)’ (2011) ILJ 222; 
C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘European Labour Law at er Laval’ in MA Moreau (ed.), Before and At er 
the Crisis (Elgar, 2011).
62 KD Ewing and J Hendy, ‘h e Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) ILJ 2, 8.
63 See B Ryan, ‘h e Charter and Collective Labour Law’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds.), Economic and 
Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A legal perspective (Hart, 2003).
64 Ibid (n 24).
65 See Opinion 2/13 of the CJEU, paras. 187–190.
66 h e latter has been partly remedied in Case C-396/13 Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v Elektrobudowa 
Spółka Akcyjna, judgment of 12 February 2015.
67 For an overview of the discussion, see A. Bücker, ‘A comprehensive Social Progress Protocol is 
needed more than ever’ (2013) 4 ELLJ 4.
68 See the failed Monti II proposal COM(2012) 130 proposed under Article 352 TFEU. Article 352 TFEU 
allows the EU institutions to adopt legislation in areas where the Treaties do not provide the necessary 
powers in order to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties. h e adoption of such legislation 
requires unanimity from the Council and consent of the European Parliament. National parliaments 
must also be given the opportunity to scrutinise the proposed legislation before its adoption.
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the reach of EU law and contributing to the discovery of new general principles.69 
h is is dependent on the CJEU’s willingness to interpret the provisions of the CFR. By 
enhancing the CJEU’s ability to draw on a range of provisions in the social i eld, the 
CFR provides new possibilities for the interpretation of existing labour rights.70 One 
obstacle to a broad interpretation of Article 28 CFR is likely to be the uncertainty as to 
whether the provisions contained within Chapter IV Solidarity (including Article 28) 
are ‘rights’ or ‘principles’.71 However, increased formalisation of the relationship 
between EU and international law (particularly in light of the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR) has profound consequences for labour standards in this respect. h e distinction 
between ‘rights’, more commonly provided under supranational and domestic legal 
systems, and the ‘principles’ underpinning international standards, is dissolving. h e 
prominence given to international provisions within the EU’s acquis by the CFR and 
the EU’s impending accession to the ECHR means that such distinctions are likely to 
become unsustainable so that principles which are enshrined within the international 
order will have to be given real credence in future judgments of the CJEU, one 
example being the wide interpretation given by the ECtHR to freedom of association 
under Article 11 ECHR.72 h e consequences of this process would be a move towards 
recognition of freedom of association in line with international standards by the CJEU.
4.2. MINIMUM LABOUR STANDARDS
Trade unions struggle to ef ectively challenge employers’ conduct in those sectors 
where trade union membership, and consequently collective bargaining rates 
and collective agreement coverage, is low. h is includes, inter alia, the service and 
agricultural sectors which have a high proportion of new Member State workers and 
where a number of problems arise: new Member State workers struggle to enforce 
their rights; trade unions are not able to ensure that labour standards are being 
upheld; and, national workers are fearful that they are being undercut by new Member 
State workers receiving lower wages.73 h e CJEU’s decisions in Laval and Rüf ert 
69 K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 ECLR 375, 
386. h e arguments in this paragraph are further expanded in Busby and Zahn (n 57). However, 
the CJEU has also used the CFR as a basis to discover new rights such as the ‘freedom to conduct a 
business’ contained in Article 16 CFR. See further J. Prassl, ‘Business Freedoms and Employment 
Rights in the European Union’ (2015) CYELS 189.
70 N Busby and R Zahn, ‘h e EU and the ECHR: Collective and Non-discrimination Labour Rights at 
a Crossroad?’ (2014) IJCLLIR 2.
71 h e CFR does not distinguish between rights and principles. Where rights are clearly articulated, 
its text contains specii c restrictions relating to their exercise. h e revised Explanations to the 
Charter (OJ 2007 C 303) provide examples of ‘principles’, for example, Article 26 on the integration 
of persons with disabilities, but they also state that some articles may contain elements of rights 
and principles. See, further, C Barnard ‘h e EU Charter of Rights. Happy 10th Birthday’, [2011] 24 
EUSA Review 5, available: <https://eustudies.org/assets/i les/eusa_review/winter2011.pdf>, 6.
72 See, further, Schiek (n 53) 78–85.
73 Ibid n 3.
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have thrown a spotlight on these concerns in the case of posted workers. However, 
the issues of non-enforcement of labour standards in certain sectors, along with the 
fear of new Member State workers engaging in ‘social dumping’ (whether as posted 
workers or as free moving workers), were present well before the CJEU’s judgments74 
and have not been properly resolved since the CJEU handed down its decisions.
For trade unions, there are a number of options in responding to these 
developments. h ey can either establish a presence in these sectors through ef ective 
recruitment – a strategy that has only been partially successful in certain, very 
specii c cases – or they can push for legal regulation to help them to challenge the 
employer’s conduct in these areas. Such regulation would create the necessary space in 
which trade unions can represent workers and regulate the employment relationship. 
Positive legal regulation in this case can take two forms: either to lobby for a system 
whereby collective agreements can be declared universally applicable; or, to support 
legislation which establishes minimum labour standards. h e former option is only 
feasible if there is indeed a representative collective agreement (and representative 
bodies to negotiate it) which can be declared universally applicable. h is is ot en 
not the case in those sectors where trade unions struggle to establish a presence, 
so such legislation would only be of benei t for trade unions in those sectors where 
some regulation through collective bargaining already takes place. In these areas, the 
provision of a legal framework which enables collective agreements to be declared 
universally applicable could provide support for collective bargaining whereby the 
state delegates the task of regulating a particular sector to those parties who are most 
familiar with the sector: trade unions and employers.
In those sectors where this is not an option, trade unions should consider 
supporting the introduction of minimum labour standards. As Ewing argues:
If collective bargaining is to be a means of delivering a standard of social and economic 
security, the State has an obligation to make adequate provision for those excluded from the 
process, and to make provision also to deal with questions of social citizenship which may 
stand on its fringes, dealt with by some but not all collective agreements. h is suggests the 
need for a comprehensive regulatory framework operating alongside collective bargaining, 
both underpinning and complementing the process.75
Cases like Laval illustrate the vulnerability of a system of industrial relations based, 
predominantly, on collective bargaining. h us, it would be in trade unions’ interests to 
support the introduction of comprehensive minimum labour standards, particularly 
for those sectors where unions struggle to establish a presence. Such legislation 
should provide for labour standards to be set in consultation with the social partners 
74 See, for example, the Irish Ferries Dispute (T. Krings, ‘Irish Ferries, Labour Migration and the 
Spectre of Displacement’ in M. Corcoran and P. Share, Belongings: Shaping Identity in Modern 
Ireland (Institute of Public Administration 2008).
75 K. Ewing, ‘Democratic Socialism and Labour Law’ (1995) ILJ 24, 103.
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thereby giving trade unions a role to play in their regulation. In addition, trade unions 
should be given a role in supervising the enforcement of minimum labour standards. 
h e potential role of trade unions as ef ective enforcers of labour standards was 
most visible in situations like the Irish Ferries Dispute in Ireland76 or the Lindsey 
Oil Rei nery Dispute in the UK.77 h ere have also been some legislative attempts to 
remedy enforcement problems at a national level which were triggered by the increase 
in free movement following the recent EU enlargements. For example, in Austria, 
the Lohn- und Sozialdumpingbekämpfungsgesetz78 attempts to prevent payment below 
collectively agreed terms and conditions. In the UK, trade unions successfully lobbied 
for the introduction of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 which aims to regulate 
labour providers in certain industries which have a high proportion of migrant 
workers. In Ireland, the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 201579 proposes to 
allow trade unions and employers to apply to the Labour Court to undertake a review 
of pay/pensions/sick pay in terms of workers in a particular sector. h e Labour Court 
can then make recommendations to the Minister for the making of an order in these 
areas which will have legal ef ect. Nonetheless, problems with enforcement of labour 
standards remain, and trade unions would benei t from laws which give them – as 
worker representatives – a role to play in enforcement.
At the Union level, there is a general lack of competence to regulate employment 
conditions. Directive 2014/5480 aims to facilitate the free movement of workers, to 
increases the options for workers who make use of their rights to free movement to 
raise individual complaints, and establishes the obligation of Member States to provide 
some support for individual rights enforcement. However, trade union involvement is 
voluntary and the Directive therefore does little to combat the concerns over increased 
migration following the recent EU enlargements. Other EU legislative proposals, such 
as the Monti II Regulation,81 have ended in failure. EU level collective agreements 
are also not a viable alternative. Although Articles 154(3) and 155 TFEU allow for 
the conclusion of EU level collective agreements independently from EU legislation, 
management and labour at EU level generally respect the prerogative of national 
76 Ibid n 74.
77 See, further, C. Barnard, ‘“British Jobs for British Workers”: h e Lindsey Oil Rei nery Dispute and 
the Future of Local Labour Clauses in an Integrated EU Market’ (2009) 38 ILJ 245; and R. Zahn, 
‘“British Jobs for British workers”: h e problem of collective agreements in the UK’ (2010) 55 Juridical 
Review 181. See also ACAS, Report of an Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Lindsey Oil 
Rei nery Dispute, 16 February 2009 www.acas.org.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=1019&p=0.
78 BGBI I Nr. 2011/24. h e law criminalises payment below collectively agreed terms and conditions.
79 An overview of the bill is available under www.djei.ie/press/2015/20150508.htm; the Bill can be 
accessed at www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=28887&&CatID=59.
80 Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures facilitating 
the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers. 
h e Directive seeks to increase awareness of the free movement rules amongst public and private 
employers in order to minimise discrimination of EU workers in host Member States.
81 Ibid n 68.
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social partners and limit themselves to the conclusion of framework agreements for 
autonomous implementation.82 h ere have been some instances of coordination of 
collective bargaining,83 but the main form of negotiation that takes place at EU level 
occurs through the social dialogue.84
Individual labour law systems are diverse and specii c to a national tradition. h is 
makes EU level legislation dii  cult to achieve and has led to inconsistencies in the process 
of europeanisation. In the current context where the EU is made up of 28 Member 
States and has limited competence in the labour law sphere, dif erent social and labour 
rights must be regulated at dif erent levels. h is is also in line with the EU’s principle 
of subsidiarity (Article 5(3) TEU). h us, overarching, fundamental rights such as the 
right to freedom of association must be guaranteed not only at the national level but 
also at the EU level. By way of contrast, the regulation of labour standards should only 
be undertaken at EU level if this can be done successfully. If this is not the case, then the 
EU institutions should limit themselves to creating the necessary space either through 
legislative intervention or abstention, within which collective bargaining can take place 
at the EU or the national level. In the case of the former, this involves the strengthening 
of the social dialogue and the constructive involvement of the social partners in the 
development of social policy and in the development of best practice through the use 
of sot  law mechanisms. In the latter case, whenever relevant EU legislation such as a 
Directive is adopted, this should make provision for the involvement of trade unions 
in its implementation thereby encouraging collective bargaining at a national level. 
Finally, the EU institutions could give support to the social partners to engage in 
transnational and/or EU level collective bargaining on feasible topics.
5. CONCLUSION
Trade unions across Europe are struggling to respond to the challenges that have arisen 
following the recent EU enlargements by relying solely on their traditional functions 
which centre around the encouragement of collective bargaining. However, collective 
bargaining is only one of the methods of trade unionism and it is therefore timely 
for trade unions to consider legislative change as an alternative and complementary 
method. Laws at national and EU level which secure the right to freedom of association 
and which provide for minimum labour standards for all works would enable trade 
unions to ef ectively challenge the employer and regulate the employer’s conduct.
82 Schiek (n 72).
83 See J. Hof mann and R. Hof mann, ‘Prospects for European industrial relations and trade unions in 
the midst of modernisation, Europeanisation and globalisation’ (2009) Transfer 389; M. Keune and 
P. Marginson, ‘Transnational Industrial Relations as Multi-Level Governance: Interdependencies in 
European Social Dialogue’ (2013) BJIR 473; and, D. Schiek, ‘Europäische Kollektivvereinbarungen’ 
in W. Däubler, (ed.) Tarifvertragsgesetz. Kommentar (Nomos 2012).
84 See, further, Articles 153, 154, 155 TFEU.
